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Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem?
Tim Swanson1 and Ben Groom2

1. Introduction3
Regulating global biodiversity fundamentally concerns the question of how much total
habitat conversion we wish to undertake across the globe as a whole. (Swanson 1994)
This is a distinct question from how each individual state might view the importance of
conservation for its own purpose, or even for the benefit of others. Our question is
focused on the impact of the aggregate level of land-based development on earth. This
is a global question – from the sustainability perspective - concerning whether the
earth’s system can continue to extend highly productive land uses (such as agriculture
and hence the associated human population) without reaching some sort of limit to the
aggregate amount of this type of development that the earth’s system can sustain. It is
very similar to the questions raised in general at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) – how is global development
to be made consonant with the global environment? In this article we examine the basic
structure of the problem that is being addressed in this context, and the range of
international policies that have been attempted. Finally we examine why these policies
have been less than wholly successful.4
We turn now to these issues in the remainder of this contribution. First, in section 2 we
set out the stylised facts regarding development and biodiversity – what is the global
problem that needs to be regulated? Section 3 presents the biodiversity regulation
problem as a simple land-use model of North-South interdependence in the
biotechnology sector with biodiversity as a global public good. After establishing the
efficient allocation we employ Nash Bargaining theory to illustrate the factors that
determine the cooperative solution within this framework. Section 4 discusses the
international policies for addressing this problem, the Convention on Biological
Diversity and associated institutions, in light of the bargaining framework that we
construct. Section 5 discusses why there are no lasting solutions in place for the global
biodiversity problem. A conclusion follows.
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We are analysing the problem as one of halting global conversion, and then determining the incidence of
such a policy, given that different countries have experienced more conversion than others. (for a similar
analysis in the context of the Montreal Protocol, see Swanson and Mason 2003) We argue that the
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2. When is Biodiversity Regulation a Global Problem?
The regulation of global biodiversity concerns management of the ongoing practice of
land conversion across the globe. This is a practice that commenced about ten thousand
years ago, and has been targeted first at some continents and then at others. The first
places to experience massive land use change have been the more temperate areas
(Europe, north Asia, north America), and in some cases the land conversion that
occurred long ago is near complete.5
This has resulted in some striking asymmetries on earth. For one thing, the parts of the
earth where the vast majority biodiversity resides are few. The majority of species on
earth are now believed to reside in the final three great tropical rainforest systems
(Amazon, Congo, Indonesian). And most indicators of species’ continued existence
indicate the same general locations and nations as the hosts of the remaining diversity.
Table 1: Countries with Greatest "Species Richness"
Mammals
Birds
Reptiles
Indonesia (515)
Colombia (1721)
Mexico (717)
Mexico (449)
Peru (1701)
Australia (686)
Brazil (428)
Brazil (1622)
Indonesia (600)
Zaire (409)
Indonesia (1519)
India (383)
China (394)
Ecuador (1447)
Colombia (383)
Peru (361)
Venezuela (1275)
Ecuador (345)
Colombia (359)
Bolivia (1250)
Peru (297)
India (350)
India (1200)
Malaysia (294)
Uganda (311)
Malaysia (1200)
Thailand (282)
Tanzania (310)
China (1195)
Papua N.G. (282)
Source: McNeely et. al. 1990. Conserving the World's Biological Diversity. International
Union for the Conservation of Nature: Gland,Switzerland.

On the other hand, a quick look at the same states concerned indicates that there is an
interesting but inverse correlation between species richness and other forms of wealth.
Many of the states that are amongst the wealthiest in terms of biodiversity are also
amongst the poorest in terms of standard measures of income.
Table 2: GDP per capita in the Diversity-Rich States
Country

2003 GDP p.c. (PPP)

Country

2003 GNP p.c (PPP)

Tanzania
Uganda
India
Ecuado r
China

$
$
$
$
$

Papua,NG
Indonesia
Bolivia
Colombia
Brazil

$
$
$
$
$

600
1400
2900
3300
5000

2200
3200
2400
7300
7600

World Average
$ 8,200
OECD Average
$ 26,300
Source: The World Bank 2006. OECD 2006.

5

For example, the amount of wilderness habitat (defined as unaltered land mass of at least 2500 sq. km.)
in Europe is now certifiably zero. (World Resources Institute 2003)
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This asymmetry between the holders of biodiversity assets and those holding other
forms of assets demonstrates one of the basic problems of managing global resources –
the asymmetry in endowments. It makes outcomes difficult to negotiate, when starting
points are so far apart.
How did this asymmetry result? The fundamental cause is the order in which states
have converted their lands. Some have done so thousands of years ago (Europe), others
hundreds of years ago (North America), and others over the past few decades (Latin
America, Southeast Asia). The globe has lost four per cent of its forested lands – to
agriculture – over the past couple of hundred years. At the same time many of those
countries that have deforested, also advanced their agriculture and other industries
dependent upon larger populations and urban densities. In the long view, development
has often been initiated with land conversion and agriculture. For this reason, it has
long been the case that national incomes have gone up while forested areas have gone
down.
From this viewpoint it is possible to view the problem of regulating global biodiversity
as one of the regulation of global land use conversion, where the external costs of
conversion are increasing as the conversions continue apace. In this framework the
concern over sustainability is that there may be a global – or aggregate – limit to the
amount of conversion that might be able to be incurred.6 Figure 1 gives a depiction of a
regulatory scenario for this problem of global land use conversion. It is a problem of
the un-internalised costliness of land conversions.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
In Figure 1, the various types of biodiversity problems are segregated: local, regional,
and global.
The lowermost curve in the diagram represents the “perceived MC of land conversion”
– as viewed from the perspective of the converting landowner (most often the state or
private landowner with jurisdiction over the land).7 The dashed line just above this
curve concerns the more generalised or social MC of such land conversions, when the
role of that parcel of land is considered as part of a larger eco-system. This social cost
represents the local and regional externalities flowing from that particular piece of
terrain being converted.
These local and regional costs may not be fully internalised to the decision-maker
considering land conversion, because they might flow to the broader watershed
community (who receive clean water from the unconverted watershed), or the broader
forest community (who may desire a wider range of uses of the land concerned) or even
the broader global community (who may hope for large unconverted land areas to
support charismatic species, such as the panda or the elephant). These are the problems
6

We are defining the global problem of biodiversity as that problem that requires international regulation
for its resolution. Many other facets of the biodiversity decline may be addressed through appropriate
domestic regulation (e.g. watershed management) or bilateral transfers (e.g. payments for parks and
protected areas).
7
We show MC as declining over the entire range of land conversion but the same points (about various
forms of externalities) exists if the MC begins to incline at some point in the process.
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considered by groups who hope to internalise local and regional values of ecosystems to
existing decision makers. (TEEB 2011) The conversion of any piece of land will
involve some amount of externalities (given its role in other systems) but it will not
matter much in which order the land is converted; the externalities are borne whenever
that piece is lost. For this reason the external cost is represented by a simple vertical
shift of the MC curve upwards (a constant cost to any piece of land converted, whenever
it is converted).
The problem of regulating global biodiversity is different from this “local externality”
problem, and concerns the potential limits to a particular development strategy, here the
practice of land conversion. (Swanson 1995b) In Figure 1, this is represented by the
uppermost MC curve - where the social marginal cost of continued conversion (beyond
some limit) goes to infinity.8 This rapidly escalating cost of conversion would be the
case if there is indeed a limit on the total amount of global land use conversion that is
feasible – while retaining a relatively stable and resilient biological system that is
capable of maintaining a life system within which humans can survive. 9
Is sustainability really a problem in this context? There are several reasons why
biodiversity may be critical to maintaining the entire production system. First,
unconverted lands act as “firebreaks”, to reduce the rate of arrival of new biological
problems. (Goeschl and Swanson 2003a) When such problems do arise, it is
recognised that genetic resources play a crucial role in supplying the options or solution
concepts within the life sciences industries. (Kassar and Lassere 2005). Biodiversity
does this by supplying genetic resources to R&D sectors supplying the life sciences
industries. (Sarr, Goeschl and Swanson 2008). It may be possible for technological
advance to substitute for biodiversity resources in the long run, but at least at present
(and certainly in the past) most problems in the life sciences were dealt with using
existing genetic resources. (Swanson 1995a)
Figure 1 also demonstrates the difficulty involved in halting the global land use
conversion process. States and private landowners perceive a marginal cost that enables
conversion to take place – and the converted receive an uncompensated flow of benefits
from the unconverted, providing further incentive to join the ranks of the converted.10 If
this process continues, the converted system continues to become more unstable and
less resilient (as biological problems are a function of scale and contiguity) while the
area of unconverted lands (from which solutions must originate) becomes smaller.
(Goeschl and Swanson 2003) For this reason it is to be anticipated that there is a limit
to this process of conversion, after which the costs of ongoing conversion goes to
infinity, representing the instability of ongoing aggregate conversions.

8

Bringing to mind the comment attributed to Michael Toman on Constanza et. al. (2001) that their
estimate of natural capital’s aggregate value at $50 trilllion dollars represented “a very serious
underestimate of infinity.....”
9
The global problem has more in common with the problem of climate change than the problem of
ecosystem valuation. It is a question of determining whether there is a limit to conversion-based
development.
10
This is the case because the unconverted lands reduce the arrival of problems and provide solutions –
but the benefits from these activities are realised by reason of increased production on converted lands.
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3. Structure of the Biodiversity Bargaining Problem: theory and case study
We have developed the very general argument that land conversion may have a global
cost. We will look at a case study of agricultural conversion to demonstrate.
There is substantial evidence that converted agricultural habitats continue to rely upon
unconverted ones for their sustainability. Modern high yielding agriculture relies upon
the conversion of lands to mono-cultural crops across large land areas. These converted
lands then provide large pay-offs to the selection of pests, parasites and pathogens that
feed well upon them. (Goeschl and Swanson 2003b). For this reason, the populations
of well-adapted pests can be expected to grow rapidly in the converted areas, rendering
the planted varieties unproductive in a matter of a few years (which may be 50-60
generations of pests and pathogens). Modern converted agricultural lands planted in
high yielding varieties must then have ongoing injections of diverse germplasm (genetic
resources) from outside the converted area. Otherwise, a high yielding commercial
plant variety is commercially extinct in about 5-10 years on average, and the source of
the solution to the pest problem will have to originate from outside the production
system. (Goeschl and Swanson 2003a)
It is important for both parts of the world – converted (here, North) and unconverted
(here, South) to cooperate in the production of global agricultural product through
maintaining lands in both sectors, cultivated and natural. The problem is that the North
generates the final product in this situation, but does so in reliance in part on the
maintenance of a natural habitat sector in the South. Some sort of bargain must be
struck in order to share the value of the product, in recognition of the joint production
that is occurring. In order to address the problem of biodiversity decline (and provide
for sustainability) it is necessary for North and South to first of all reach agreement on
this distributional matter – the biodiversity bargaining problem.

3.1 Biodiversity and biotechnology: an example
The case study captures the asymmetries and mutual dependence in the agricultural
plant breeding sector in a stylised manner.11 We will move the analysis to the level of
international bargaining, by discussing the industry as consisting of two Agents (North,
South) who are distinctive in three fundamental respects: capital endowments, industrial
structures and land use choices. The asymmetry in capital endowments refers to the
relative richness of the North in human capital but poverty in natural (genetic) capital,
while the South retains its relative richness in genetic capital but without a very rich
human capital base. The industrial structure refers to the unique existence of an R&D
sector in the North specialised in the production of intermediate goods containing
embedded innovations, in contrast to the focus on primary production in the South. The
distinct land use choices refer primarily to the South's unique capacity for supplying a
biodiversity reserve sector, but also to the fact that the South's alternative land uses
include both an intensive agricultural sector that is technology-dependent and a
traditional sector which is not; whereas the North's land uses are relatively

11

The following section outlines the analysis taken by Gatti et al. (2011).
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undifferentiated and involve mainly various forms of modern intensive agricultural
production.
These asymmetries give rise to a coordination problem associated with the mutual
interdependence between the North and South. In Figure 2 the arrow running from the
Reserves sector to the agricultural biotechnology sector reflects that the North uses its
relatively abundant human capital within its R&D sector in combination with genetic
resources from the South to produce intermediate goods within which innovations are
embedded. However, the North has no land use choice regarding the retention of genetic
resource reserves (as losses of genetic resources are irreversible) but only has choices
over different productive uses of its own agricultural lands, one use employing the
intermediate goods from the R&D sector and the other not.12
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The South, on the other hand. has a natural capital endowment of reserve lands (R)
endowed with diverse genetic resources which produce a flow of information which is
useful when embedded within the intermediate goods of the R&D sector of the North.
The South's land use choice consists of both reserve retention and two methods of
agricultural production, one of which uses the intermediate goods from the North, s,
(arrow running from North to South in Figure 2) and the other traditional production, t,
which does not.
The transfer of genetic material from South to North, and the transfer of technology
from North to South, captures the mutual interdependence arising from these regional
asymmetries.13 The extent of the transfer of these resources depends on the extent of
cooperation between the two regions. The global problem now becomes one of optimal
allocation of land in the South to Reserves, and hence the supply of genetic material to
the enhance productivity in the North, and the optimal allocation of technology transfer
to the South. Of course, the expansion of intensive agriculture in the South is a means
by which cooperative surplus might be shared between the North and the South, but this
strategy is potentially in conflict with the objective of retaining maximum amount of
genetic resources for the R&D sector. The problem we examine is how the North and

12

Gatti et al (2011) represent the northern land endowment as

L N and the output as

y N = π (R ) n + b(LN − n ) , where π (R ) n is the production function in intensive agriculture which
captures the North’s dependence on Reserves R as a productivity enhancing input since π (0 ) = 1 and
π ' (R ) > 0 . The costs of R&D are assumed to rise with the quantity of the intermediate output, i.e.

c(ns ) . The North can also make a transfer payment, T , to the South. Northern utility is then given by:
U N (n, s, t ) = (π (R ) − b ) n − c(n + s ) − T + bLN .
13
The South is endowed with land, LS which is originally rich in genetic material. It can be maintained
as Reserves with area R , or converted to either a traditional sector, t , or to an intensive agricultural
sector using seed imported from the North, s. The traditional sector incurs a labour-related cost k (t )
( k (0 ) = 0, k ′(⋅) > 0, k ′′(⋅) > 0 ). Lastly, land can be used in an intensive sector which, like in the North,
is augmented by the presence of Reserves, R : π (R ) s . Therefore, Southern utility is then given by:
U S (n, s, t ) = π ( R ) s + t − k (t ) + T , where T is any transfer from the North.
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South might simultaneously determine land uses to maximise global surplus and
distribute this surplus within such an asymmetric bargaining environment14.
This defines the asymmetric environment over which bargaining can take place in
relation to global biodiversity and raises one fundamental question: How should the
shares of the parties be determined in order to allow joint production (cooperation) to
proceed? In order to answer these questions we describe the biodiversity bargaining
problem.

3.2 The framework of the North-South biodiversity bargaining problem
We now place the biodiversity bargaining into the general structure of the bargaining
problem, as defined in the literature stemming from Nash (1953) and Rubenstein
(1982). The outcomes of any bargaining problem among rational agents are confined
by two important limits: the conflict point and the bargaining frontier. These measure
the outcomes for each agent in the absence and presence of cooperation. The conflict
point provides the benchmark against which all bargaining solutions are measured
whereas the bargaining frontier represents all possible distributions of the cooperative
surplus between the negotiating parties. Figure 3 provides a general illustration of this
framework given different possible starting points.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Figure 3. A Bargaining Game – defined by conflict point and cooperative frontier
On each axis is measured the outcomes for two agents, here the North and South, in
terms of “utility”: U S and U N . The conflict point reflects their respective levels of
utility in the absence of cooperation, and is represented by point U a . In this case the
North and South receive low levels of utility given by U Na and U Sa respectively. The

bargaining frontier is shown by the thick black line running between (U NE , U Sa ) and

(U

a
N

)

, U SE . Rational agents will not accept any bargaining outcome with a lower payoff
than at the conflict point, since non-cooperation is always available to them. The limit
of the cooperative possibilities is give by the bargaining frontier. These points define
the limits of the bargaining possibilities. (In Figure 3 we illustrate how two such
bargaining games might be defined around distinct conflict points- each conflict point
defining a completely distinct game).
We are interested in the outcome of the bargaining game described above over global
biodiversity. So how is the conflict point and the bargaining frontier defined in this
case? We assume that the conflict point is an autarkic state in which there is no
exchange of biotechnological outputs, that is, new plant varieties, and no transfers are
used to transfer any surplus or contract over or coerce land allocations. When
cooperation fails the South benefits only from traditional agriculture. Reserves which
14

As will become clear, this is in effect an assumption of a linear bargaining frontier with perfect
transfers of surplus. Miller et al. (2000) discuss some of the implications of this assumption in relation to
the Pacific Salmon Treaty. We avoid this discussion here.
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contain genetic material are simply a residual land allocation since the South does not
internalise their value embedded in new technologies or receive any related payments.
For this reason there is under supply of the global public good.15
The North, on the other hand, still benefits from the presence of any residual reserves
(R) due to spillovers arising from their public good nature. So, despite being autarkic,
the non-excludable nature of genetic resources contained in the reserves is captured in
this solution. Modelling the conflict point in this way captures the fact that the North is
dependent upon the South's selection of reserves to generate productivity in the
intensive sector, while the South has no reason to supply reserves in the absence of a
flow of intermediate goods or contracted payment from the North. Acting in isolation
the South makes land use decisions which lower the marginal productivity of the
North's intensive sector, (n). This stylisation of the conflict point represents the solution
in the absence of a cooperative agreement, with the South undersupplying reserves since
it has no reason to consider the positive externality on the North, and the North
benefitting from Southern biodiversity as a spillover from residual lands only.
This allows us to define the bargaining frontier as the solution to the "social planner
problem": the integrated or cooperative solution for this industry. This is akin to solving
the production problem of a single vertically integrated industry in which the issues of
sovereignty and asymmetry are ignored, and all cooperative opportunities are exploited.
The solution maximises the global surplus and the bargaining frontier then reflects all
the Pareto efficient shares of the global surplus between North and South. This is shown
by the thick line between (U NE , U Sa ) and (U Na , U SE ) in Figure 3.16 The triangle formed by
the bargaining frontier and the conflict point is called the bargaining set and reflects all
the possible cooperative agreements that could arise making each party at least as well
of as in conflict.
Given the positive social value of genetic diversity in the biotechnology sector, the
globally efficient solution would result in more southern land allocated to Reserves than
under autarky ( R ∗ > R a ). In short, to attain the Pareto optimal bargaining frontier
requires greater levels of conservation.
In some instances these regions specialise completely, with the South specialising in the
provision of reserves, and the North in R&D and intensive production.17 Specialisation
here results from the fundamental asymmetries: the fact that only the South can provide
Reserves while the value from intensive production may be pursued in either region.
Although both are necessary for the production of joint surplus, under these conditions
the emphasis is on the South providing that which only it can provide (i.e. Reserves).
This is indicative of the importance of cooperation in this context: when acting
separately each pursues a similar mix of relatively unproductive activities, when acting
cooperatively the two generate a vertical industry in which the South specialises in
15

We assume that the North and the South are single entities. This reflects the idea that the countries in
the South are sufficiently large to influence the North in the bargaining solution.
16
The social planner problem is defined as follows (Gatti el al., 2009):

max U (n, s, t ) = U S + U N = π ( R)(n + s ) − bn + t − c(n + s ) − k (t ) + bLN
n, s, t

s.t. R = LS − s − t and l = LN − n and s, n, t , l , R ≥ 0
17

The detail of this can be found in Proposition 1 in Appendix 1.
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Reserves and the North specialises in final production. The incentive to cooperate is
found in the enhanced productivity emanating from the industry. We turn now to
defining the level of that cooperative surplus.

3.3 The cooperative surplus
In terms of Figure 3, the optimal welfare under the social planner solution is given by
any value of U S + U N on the bargaining frontier. Suppose that negotiations result in an
agreement at U * . In that case optimal welfare is given by U ∗ = U N∗ + U S∗ . A
comparison with the outcomes of the conflict point provides a definition of the
cooperative surplus, U C , as the difference between the welfare under the social planner
and that under autarky, U C = U ∗ − U Na + U Sa . Since the social planner is always able to
select the autarky\non-cooperative outcome, it is safe to say that the social planner
solution will yield positive gains from cooperation: U C ≥ 0.

(

)

Now that the nature of the biodiversity bargaining problem has been established, the
∗
indeterminacy of the solution is obvious. Each one of the points along U can be
sustained as the Nash Equilibrium of a cooperative bargaining game. We turn now to
the theoretical solutions to this problem and then to their relation to existing institutions.

3.4 The Nash solution – agreements on distributional rules or norms
Now that we have laid out the fundamental structure of the biodiversity bargaining
problem, we can move towards a discussion of how the resolution of this problem might
be determined. To this end we first illustrate the family of solutions to a conventional
Nash Cooperative Bargaining Game (NCBG). In Nash cooperative bargaining theory,
there are primarily two determinative characteristics of the outcome to any bargaining
game: a) the parties' respective conflict points; and b) the parties' respective bargaining
powers. The key insights from the Nash bargaining solution are firstly that rational
agents will attain a Pareto optimal solution. That is, they will agree on some point on
the bargaining frontier such as U * in Figure 3. This indicates the set of outcomes that
can be eliminated from consideration. Secondly, the specific solution depends on the
bargaining power of the respective parties. If bargaining power is not determinate, then
any point on the bargaining frontier can be a solution to a NCBG.18
Bargaining strength may derive from many factors that are characteristic of the agents.
The parameter α represents a "sharing rule" or norm that determines the share of the
overall cooperative surplus that will accrue to each party. In the original Nash
formulation, in which individuals were considered, the sharing norm was implicitly

18

Formally, the general solution to an asymmetric NCBG is given by the maximisation of:

(U N − U Na )α (U S − U Sa ) (1−α ) s.t. U N + U S = U ∗ , where the parameter α ∈ [0,1] is an index of
relative bargaining power. The outcomes of this bargaining problem for the North and the South are then:

U N∗ = (1 − α )U Na + α (U ∗ − U Sa ) and U S∗ = αU Sa + (1 − α )(U ∗ − U Na ) . See e.g. Nash (1953)
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assumed to be 50:50.19 Various norms have been adopted in international negotiations
over rivers, fisheries and other resources. (Barrett 2002) The main point is that some
sort of norm or agreed sharing mechanism must be observed in order to achieve a
resolution to the bargaining problem. The “sharing rule” must be accepted by both
parties (or able to be imposed by one) in order to be a lasting resolution. We will term
this a “fair” resolution to the bargaining game (and return to this discussion in Section
5).

3.5 Sealing the deal: Contractual solutions to rational bargaining
To settle on the outcome is not enough in practice of course. To uphold the solution will
require the conclusion of some sort of a contract between the North and the South, and
the agreement of its terms. This contract will then specify the precise point within the
NCBG that is agreed to be the implemented outcome.
The “general” contracts of implementation must specify the efficient land allocations
and contain a number of transfers to place the parties at the indicated point along the
bargaining frontier. Assuming the North offers a contract to the South, for instance, the
contract would contain three components. First, the North, as residual claimant, claims
the surplus accruing in the South from the intensive agriculture sector. Second, the
South is compensated for the costs of participation in the agreement. This involves
compensation for the lost output from the traditional sector incurred as a consequence of
the efficient, rather than autarkic, land allocation. Together these two components place
the South back at the conflict point in terms of welfare, albeit with efficient land
allocations. In Figure 3 this is reflected by a point such as (U N* , U SE ) . Lastly, the contract
must contain a component which transfers the agreed share of the global surplus back
from N to S.20 An analogous contract can be specified for the same agreed bargaining
solution, only with the South as residual claimant.
There are, of course, two special cases of this general contract which reflect the
complete absence of bargaining strength for one or other party. These “extreme point”
contracts, in which in which one or other party receives the entire cooperative surplus
would simply place the South at point U N* , U SE in Figure 3 if it had no bargaining

(

)

(

)

strength, or North at point U , U in the opposite case.21 Therefore, extreme point
contracts support distributions that correspond to the limits of the bargaining frontier, in
which one party is devoid of all bargaining power (α = 1 or α = 0) , and such contracts
E
N

*
S

19

See for instance Bowles and Gintis (2000) who discuss norms in the context of the ultimatum game.
Here large deviations from a 50:50 split are frequently rejected. There is also evidence to show that
sharecropping agreements frequently take the form of 50:50 shares (e.g. Bardhan 1984).
20
Gatti et al. (2011) specify the general North-South contract as follows:

TN (t ) = ∫ [1 − k ( z )] dz
t
1
4
4244
3
ta

Compensati on for costs of
participat ion : Lost traditional
production .
21

− π ( LS − s ∗ − t ) s ∗ + (1 − α )U C
144
42444
3 14243
Residual claimant (North)
repatriates surplus

The extreme point contract supporting

(U

*
N

Residual claimant
transfers agreed share of
cooperative surplus

, U SE ) in Figure X.2 is therefore:

T = TN (t ) = ∫ [1 − k ′( z )]dz − π ( LS − s ∗ − t ) s ∗
ta

t
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must only satisfy the participation constraint: the contracted payoff must be greater than
or equal to the conflict payoff U Sa ,U Na .

(

)

It is important to realise that all of these contracts are in fact “efficient” in the sense that
they allow the agents to attain the bargaining frontier. It is obvious, however, that not
all international negotiations are approached and resolved by reference to a rational
bargaining process, or lead to an obvious solution to the bargaining game. So –
although any point on the bargaining frontier is indeed an efficient solution to the game
– it might not be a “fair” one in the sense of achieving a lasting resolution to the
bargaining problem. We return to the delineation of the determinants of this distinction
in Section 5.

4. Addressing the Biodiversity Bargaining Problem: International Policies
4.1 The Convention on Biological Diversity and National Sovereignty
Now that we have set up the problem of regulating global biodiversity as a Nash
bargaining problem, it is straightforward to analyse the observed outcomes within the
perspective afforded by this framework.
The main international agreement concerning biodiversity conservation is the
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The issue of providing for shares is a fundamental
principle of the framework convention. Indeed, “benefit sharing” is the third objective
of the Convention on Biodiversity:

“the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of
genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over
those resources and how benefits are shared based on a set of agreed norms and
principles derived from ethics and equity”. (UNEP 2008)
In addition, the preamble of the CBD makes clear that genetic resources represent the
sovereign resources of individual states, and removes any question regarding the
possibility of unlicensed expropriation or global free-riding. The preamble of the CBD
provides that domestic regimes have absolute sovereignty over their genetic resources.
Article 3 provides that “states have... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies…” Article 9 provides that any use or
access made to a state’s domestic resources must be in accord with the principles of
informed consent and equitable benefit sharing. Hence, the first point to make is that
the CBD does emphasise at its core the importance of addressing and resolving the
biodiversity bargaining problem.

4.2 An International Fund Mechanism for Biodiversity?
The Convention on Biological Diversity also addresses the question of the mechanism
by which this sharing is to be accomplished. This is provided for in sections 2 and 4 of
Article 20 of the CBD, as below:
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2. The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable
developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing
measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention .......

4. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by
developed country Parties ...
The mechanism by which such transfers are to occur is also indicated under the terms of
the Convention. It further provides in section 1 of Article 21 that:
There shall be a mechanism for the provision of financial resources to developing country
Parties for purposes of this Convention on a grant or concessional basis the essential elements
of which are described in this Article. ...

These provisions of the CBD create the potential for a financial mechanism by which
North-South transfers might occur. To some extent, this mechanism has come into
existence through grants under the Global Environment Facility (GEF), but no
independent “green development mechanism” has yet to come into existence. (King
1994) To this point transfers under the aegis of the CBD continue on a more ad hoc
basis.
More crucially for our purposes, the motivational principle under this part of the
convention is about compensation of costs. This approach misconceives the basic nature
of global public good provision. The CBD describes the reason for payments to those
states providing biodiversity services as one of compensation for burdens undertaken,
not of the sharing of surplus generated. In the next section we provide the reasons why
this is not the correct approach to the problem of biodiversity regulation.

4.3 Incremental Costs Contracting: An “extreme point” contract
The contractual solution applied to the biodiversity bargaining problem can be found
under the terms of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its financial
instrument the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the form of the concept of
incremental costs [IC]:
´[the North] shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable [the
South] to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing
measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention'. [Art. 20, CBD].
The meaning of the term "incremental costs" is further defined within the founding
instrument of the GEF as:
'[the costs of] additional national action beyond what is required for national
development [the baseline] that imposes additional [or incremental] costs on
countries beyond the costs that are strictly necessary for achieving their own
development goals, but nevertheless generates additional benefits that the world
as a whole can share ..."22
22

GEF/C.7/Inf.5: para.2 & GEF/C.2/6 para.2, see King (1994)
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So, where does the IC contract place the negotiating parties in the bargaining set? In
terms of the preceding analysis, the IC contract requires the North to compensate the
South for the additional costs it incurs by electing the cooperative development path
rather than its baseline development strategy.23 There is no allusion to or provision for
enhanced sharing by the South in the cooperative surplus by reason of this election, but
only provision for the compensation of its costs incurred to generate additional benefits
that the world as a whole can share. Importantly, neither does the contract condition
payment on the level of the South's Reserves.
In short, the IC contract does not bear any of the hallmarks of the efficient contract that
would be anticipated to arise out of a resolution of the NCBG. Instead, the IC contract
is a straightforward offer of the extreme point contract, in which the North offers the
South compensation for its costs incurred in participating in the cooperative outcome.
In terms of Figure 3, the IC contract places the parties at point (U N* , U SE ) , in which the
North receives the entire global surplus.
Of course, the IC contract is, on the face of it, cost effective. That is, it appears to obtain
the biggest “bang for the buck” since the North pays the lowest possible level of
compensation to the South. The question for analysis is whether such a bargain – albeit
efficient – can indeed be a final resolution to the biodiversity bargaining game. We
return to this question in section 6.

4.4 Access Rights and ABS – can property rights solve this?
As mentioned above, the third objective of the CBD is to ensure benefit sharing in
accordance with some international norms. As mentioned above, Article 9 provides that
any use or access made to a state’s domestic resources must be in accord with the
principles of informed consent and equitable benefit sharing. Article 15 provides for
the idea that traditional knowledge and information is to be compensated. The Bonn
agreement of 2004 outlines mechanisms and instruments (such as up-front payments,
revenue sharing rules and royalties) that can be used to facilitate benefit sharing. It is
widely agreed that these mechanisms are very much in their infancy in terms of efficacy
(UNEP 2008). 24
This is a private or market-based approach to creating a negotiated solution to the
bargaining problem.25 North and South can solve this problem at many different levels,
one of which might be through negotiations between private firms in the two spheres.
Such an approach hinges upon the agreement of a transaction regarding joint
production, based on property rights transfers between each. (Sarr and Swanson 2011)
The basic difficulty with a property rights-based resolution is that there are no agreed
property rights at the international level with regard to natural biological materials – and
this means that firms in the South have no foundation from which to negotiate. To
obtain internationally-recognised property rights to the information contained within
23

*

a

In terms of the model, choosing the efficient land allocation, t , rather than t .
Too often a genetic access regime is more like a legal checklist than a licensing agreement.
25
In general there is nothing inefficient about having private bargaining determine the distribution of
benefits resulting from the achievement of the socially optimal outcome a la Coase. (Coase 1960)
24
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biological materials it is necessary to either improve them, or at a minimum to
demonstrate the scientific process or method by which they may be used to generate an
innovation.26 Without a recognised property right, bargaining cannot commence. (Sarr
and Swanson 2011)
So, for these reasons, it remains difficult to initiate any sort of private bargaining over
joint production with genetic resources. This will be the case so long as rights in the
informational values of natural capital are non-existing. (Swanson 1995a) Even if
these rights are established, the private approach to bargaining must necessarily remain
only a partial solution. While these private values are thought to be significant they do
not capture the full social value of the stock of genetic resources arising from its ability
to overcome well-known phenomena associated with pathogen adaptation and
resistance.27

4.5 Whatever next? The Nagoya Protocol on Benefit Sharing
Most recently – in 2010 CBD Conference of the Parties held in Nagoya – the parties
proposed the text for a new Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit
Sharing (the Nagoya Protocol). This Protocol makes more explicit many of the terms
previously contained within the Articles of the Convention.
For example, the Nagoya Protocol Article 5 on Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing
provides in part as follows:
“In accordance with Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Convention, benefits arising from
the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications and commercialization
shall be shared in a fair and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that is the
country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in
accordance with the Convention. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.”

Similarly, Articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol provide that the access to genetic resources
and traditional knowledge should be regulated by each party, and that it should occur on
the basis of prior informed consent.28 Prior informed consent is a doctrine that is
important to use in any context in which private bargaining is taking place over social
values. For example, in the original context in which PIC was used (acceptance of
hazardous waste shipments), it makes a lot of sense to create a structure whereby the
state is informed about the transactions being undertaken by any private agents capable
26

The CBD creates an internationally recognised right to the physical genetic resources themselves, but is
silent on the question of the informational values that originate from such resources. Since information
flows freely, it is a relatively straightforward matter to become acquainted with that information without
the transfer of physical materials themselves. (It is akin to becoming acquainted with the recipe, without
having to take possession of the cake itself). A large amount of effort has been expended upon the
creation of analogous rights in information from purely genetic resources from agricultural plant breeding
– so-called Plant Breeders’ Rights, but very little effort has been made to resolve the problem of
unrecognised rights in useful biological resources more generally.
27
On the private value of biodiversity in bio-prospecting see Simpson et al. (1996), Rausser and Small
(2000). On the social value of biodiversity see Goeschl and Swanson (2002), Sarr et. al. (2006). These
values are likely to significantly outweigh private values.
28
The doctrine of “prior informed consent” was first developed in the context of the Basel Convention on
Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and provides the basis for bargained over solutions
within an environment of complete and shared information.
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of having a substantial impact upon social outcomes. It simply provides the mechanism
by which a state is informed about such private negotiations, and is given final authority
over the conclusion of such private negotiations (and the information under which to
undertake its own decision making process).
The difficulty with establishing a well-informed bargaining environment within which
negotiations are to occur is that there remains nothing as of yet over which to bargain.
As described in the preceding section, the basis for bargaining would have to be a
recognised right to the information emanating from natural genetic resources (sans
improvement) and this does not yet exist. Informed bargaining is important once the
foundations for bargaining are already in place. This is not yet the case with regard to
the informational values of genetic resources.
Another tack is taken at the biodiversity bargaining problem in Article 10 of the Nagoya
Protocol. That Article is entitled “a Global Multilateral Benefit Sharing Mechanism”,
and provides as follows:
“Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing
mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in
transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated
with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally.”

No concrete details emerged on the mechanism. The creation of a benefit sharing
mechanism is one issue that has been kicked into the long grass of biodiversity
bargaining. The intimation in Article 10 is that we should await the establishment of a
Protocol to the Protocol for the establishment of this fund.
In short, the Nagoya Protocol has yet to add anything of substance to the previous
solution concepts under the CBD.
The fundamental problem of using private
bargaining as a resolution concept lies in the absence of internationally recognised
rights in the informational values flowing from unmodified genetic resources. The
Nagoya Protocol has created a more formal structure for making access to such
resources, but it has done nothing to address the fundamental property right failure that
lies at the base of this problem.
4.6 Outside the Box? The Use and Usefulness of REDD
One of the more substantial efforts to deal with the creation of a mechanism for
managing deforestation and land conversion remains “outside the box”, i.e. it is the socalled programme for the reduction of emissions from deforestation and land
degradation (REDD). REDD had its initiation in the so-called Bali Declaration at the
UNFCCC conference there of 2007 (COP13). At that meeting a roadmap was agreed
for the adoption of a Bali Action Plan for compensating forested countries for activities
designed to prevent their deforestation or degradation. The Copenhagen Accord of
December 2009 adopted at COP15 then incorporated the recognition of a responsibility
of developed countries to compensated developing for the avoidance of deforestation
and degradation. A formal resolution was then adopted at COP16 providing for the
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establishment of avoided deforestation as one of many acceptable mitigation strategies
under the UNFCCC. This constituted the formal initiation of the so-called REDD+
programme of mitigation measures.
This has resulted in a plethora of international programmes targeted at the creation of
mechanisms for transferring funding from developed to developing countries, in return
for credits to be usable under an emissions restriction program under the UNFCCC.
Much of this activity is still within the pilot phase of these programmes, but the basic
outline of transferring funds in exchange for carbon credits is clear. The precise
mechanism for ascertaining baselines, or determining the level of credit achieved,
remains to be determined; however, the idea of paying for non-deforestation is
becoming entrenched via these REDD programmes.29 It is stated on the UN REDD+
site that it is hoped that 30 billion US dollars should be transferred annually from
developed to developing country parties under the auspices of the REDD+ nondeforestation programmes.
REDD+ is a programme that has developed out of a very different set of motivations for
the prevention of deforestation, relative to the biodiversity regulation problem. It is a
programme based on the observation that approximately one-quarter of all carbon
emissions result from deforestation rather than fossil fuel consumption. This means that
it is critical for any solution to the climate change problem to incorporate some means
for regulating land use as well as fossil fuel use, in order to control carbon releases.
The primary problem with REDD as a biodiversity regulation mechanism is that it is an
instrument that is targeting a related but not perfectly correlated objective, i.e. the
sequestration of carbon in the biosphere. There are many examples of carbon
sequestration schemes that would in fact be entirely destructive of biodiversity goals
while advancing carbon sequestration, e.g. seeding of oceans. There are even examples
of schemes that would advance forestation while diminishing diversity, e.g. monocultural plantation forestry. These are extreme examples, but illustrative of the fact that
the two goals do not necessarily go hand-in-hand.
In general, all policy economists know that it is best to have as many instruments as
there are objectives being pursued. If the goal is to pursue both maximum carbon
sequestration in the biosphere and maximum biodiversity, then the best way to do so is
to have an instrument targeting each individually.
Of course we live in the world of the second-best, and so the real question for
consideration is whether REDD+ is a mechanism that might potentially afford the
needed mechanism for doing deals in non-conversion. That is, could the problem of a
global biodiversity regulation mechanism be shoe-horned on top of this mechanism
created for the purposes of carbon sequestration?
First, the problem is one of identifying the correct bargaining frontier of the problem
that is being confronted. States that are attempting to purchase the development rights
of others with regard to fossil fuel-based development are purchasing one thing. States
that are attempting to purchase the development rights of others with regard to land
conversion are purchasing another. We would argue that both the bargaining frontiers
29

Examples of the facilitators of various REDD programmes include: UN REDD; GEF; Norwegian
Forestry Plan.
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exist and are distinct from one another. The distributional problems to be resolved are
two – one concerns the value of the life sciences industries and the other concerns the
value of fossil fuel-based industries. There is a natural inclination to want to combine
the two problems – since the purchase of non-conversion rights is one possible solution
concept to both – but this both conflates two distinct bargaining frontiers as well as
unnecessarily narrows the range of potential solution concepts for carbon sequestration.
In short, if the problem is biodiversity, then it makes sense to both fashion its own
instrument and to face its own bargaining frontier. REDD appears to be an attempt to
hit two targets with a single payment, i.e. to purchase two objectives at the price of a
single transfer. There may be a very small set of lands where the optimal use is both
carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation, but in general it is likely that the
two goals will lead toward very different targets.

5. Reframing the game: rational threats as a response to unfair bargaining
The litany of unproductive approaches to the biodiversity bargaining problem should
make clear that the authors believe that little if any real progress is being made toward
the underlying problems of global biodiversity regulation. So what? What if the
countries are not yet ready to get serious about real bargaining over biodiversity (or real
solutions to the bargaining game?)30 In this section we describe the uncooperative
outcomes likely to result when unfair bargaining is pursued.
5.1 Rational threats
Nash (1953) addressed this issue in his seminal contributions to bargaining, in
addressing the notion of so-called rational threats. Let us reconsider the way in which
the South might respond to the imposition of the IC. In terms of the bargaining
framework, the IC contract leaves the South indifferent between cooperation and noncooperation. Indeed, the South is free to simply revert to “autarky” and select the
conflict point – it is indifferent between all of these outcomes. But are there any
strategies or responses available to the South that can improve on this outcome? By
analysing this negotiation from a bargaining perspective it is possible to show that the
answer to this question is to be found in the asymmetries between the North and the
South.
Firstly, note that the sharing norms or bargaining power shown to be important by
bargaining theory, and represented by the parameter α , determine the solution on the
bargaining frontier from any given conflict point. However, in the case of the Nash
solution, the ability to shift the conflict point by one or other party confers the ability to
“re-frame” the bargaining game to their own advantage. Nash (1953) analysed precisely
this type of problem, in which shifting the conflict point, or threatening to do so, can be
a rational bargaining strategy.31 In short, the ability to reframe the bargaining problem
30

Inequitable distributions such as this are frequently at the bottom of non-cooperation, as in the case of
the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the European Sulphur Protocols of the late 80’s, and so on (Miller et al., 2000;
Mason and Swanson 1996).
31
The strategic use of rational threats to maximise payoffs in this way was first analysed by Nash (1953)
but has been extended in the cooperative bargaining literature in several directions. Whereas the Nash’s
1953 paper looked at the role of threats in improving the bargaining outcomes on the efficient bargaining
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represents another form of bargaining power.
More specifically, one feature of many solution concepts to bargaining games, including
the NCBG, is that the value received by one player, say the South (U S∗ ) is not only
increasing in the value of any outside option available to that player, that is, the conflict
outcome U Sa , but it is also increasing in the maximum value of cooperation to the other

player, the North (U N∗ − U Na ) . In essence, any actions available to one player that can
increase the value of cooperation to the other player,32 without a negative impact upon
their own outside option, increase the payoffs to that player within the cooperative
bargaining game. In essence, such a strategy would reduce the other player's potential
benefits more than their own, if the game were to be played noncooperatively, and so
makes it possible to use this threat as the basis for more power within the cooperative
game. Figure 4 illustrates how this might work. In this case the South now threatens to
push the conflict point from U a to U D , reducing the North’s conflict payoff without
affecting its own. Reframed in this way, the Nash solution now becomes (U NT , U ST )
which confers a greater share of the global surplus to the South. Such threats are not
made because of an interest in the conflict outcome, but rather because of their impact
on the agreed bargaining solution.

[INSERT FIGURE 4. ABOUT HERE]

Figure 4. The bargaining problem with strategic threats
So, how is bargaining power of this type distributed in the case of global biodiversity?
Our portrayal of a `gene rich' South and a `technology rich' North is one of specialised
yet interdependent regions. At first glance it would appear that the asymmetric
endowments would result in equivalent and reciprocal threat capacities: the North could
threaten to reduce R&D while the South could threaten to limit the supply of
Reserves33, resulting in no real bargaining advantage. However, this ignores the
question of credibility. In any application of the NCBG parties must be able to commit
to their threats, via irreversible actions34. One obvious means of making a credible
commitment is for the party concerned to threaten destruction of the required assets,
should the parties fail to reach agreement on the basis for cooperation. Here there is a
clear asymmetry in bargaining capacities: the South can credibly threaten destruction of
its environmental resources, but the North cannot credibly threaten to destroy human
frontier, more recent work in cooperative game theory has focussed on dynamic games, with inefficient
outcomes such as equilibrium unemployment and, inter alia, strategic destruction of the bargaining
surplus. Indeed, Busch et al. (1998), build on work by Shaked and Sutton (1984) to examine the
equilibrium strategies arising an asymmetric case in which one party has the capability of credibly
destroying the cooperative surplus. Such an asymmetry is likely to be unusual in real bargaining problems
and yet, as we explain below, appears to be precisely the asymmetry that exists in the context of NorthSouth bargaining over global biodiversity. That is, the asymmetry of capital endowments may well mirror
the bargaining structure, and consequently bargaining power, elaborated by Busch et al. (1998).
32
Or, equivalently, increase the costs of disagreement.
33
Parallels can be easily drawn between this type of threat for the North and the trade restrictions and
limitations on technology transfer that have been the focus of the strategic trade literature (e.g. Krugman
1979; Lai and Qiu 2003)
34
Whereas the original exposition by Nash (1953) involved an imaginary `umpire' to ensure the credibility
of the threats, any application of this model requires that the threats are credible.
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capital or information. Furthermore, the assumption of irreversibility means this threat
contains a “natural” commitment mechanism. In short, the asymmetry in capital
endowments means only the South can satisfy the necessary conditions for a credible
threat in this bargain, and it is a threat of strategic destruction.

5.2 Strategic destruction as a rational threat
While the destruction of resources as a bargaining ploy sounds alarming, it has been
noted in other contexts as a ploy to secure bargaining power.35 Nevertheless, what can
strategic destruction mean in the context of biodiversity? For concreteness, strategic
destruction of Reserves can be understood as a literal threat to destroy resources, as
witnessed in Latin America (World Bank 2003). Here, farmers offered an IC contract n
Latin America retorted “bueno, corto todo” when no compensation was offered for the
existing stock of forest resources. More generally, in the case of global biodiversity,
strategic destruction could be understood as a threat to allow ongoing and irreversible
land conversion in the absence of cooperation.
In fact, this question can be rephrased as: can the South increase the value of
cooperation to the North? Given the interdependence of the North and South in the
biotech industry it seems unlikely that the South could gain from this exercise, and
likely that this will be an extremely stringent condition. Nevertheless, Gatti et al. (2011)
show that this will be the case if the social marginal value of reserves increases rapidly
as reserves become scarce. Specifically, the social marginal value of reserves must be
higher in conflict than on the bargaining frontier. This is an extremely plausible
condition. A Nash bargaining solution with credible strategic threats could be
represented by a point such as U ST in Figure 4., where this yields a larger share of the
surplus than in the absence of threats: U S∗ , as the South’s ability to reframe the
bargaining problem is remunerated. Another implication is that if the South satisfies the
no “shooting-oneself-in-the-foot” conditions for strategic threats, this opens up the
possibility that actual destruction would increase the benefits of cooperation for the
North, therefore increasing the payoff for the South in any subsequent Nash bargaining
game. That is, conditions exist in which destruction might be undertaken, rather than
simply threatened.36
In sum, from the perspective of a bargaining problem, strategic destruction can be a
rational response to an inequitable bargaining solution like the IC contract of the CBD.
Each party brings asymmetric yet complementary inputs to the negotiating table. This in
itself suggests an equitable resolution to the bargaining problem. An inequitable
outcome would leave one party, the North, vulnerable to strategic destruction in the
South. (Gatti et. al. 2011)

35

For instance Karp (1996) provides a theoretical analysis of the incentives for strategic destruction by a
monopolist producing a durable good. This draws from a wider literature in industrial organisation.
Stranlund (1999) discusses an analogous case in which the bargaining outcome is influenced by strategic
sunk investments.
36

Busch et al. (1998) show that this kind of outcome can be an equilibrium strategy in a sequential game
with trigger strategies.
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Have we witnessed any such responses from Southern countries? The answer to this is,
yes, we have. Furthermore these cases can easily be interpreted from this bargaining
perspective. The best documented examples concern the Governments of Cameroon and
Ecuador. In Cameroon in 2008 the Minister of Forestry, Joseph Thatta, made a clear
statement of what the government perceived to be fair share of the cooperative surplus,
while effectively redefining the conflict point in the negotiations with international
conservation organisations over the Ngoyla-Mintom forest. An annual fee of US$1.6m
for 830,000 ha of biodiverse tropical forest was requested to prevent the concessions
being sold to logging companies.37 Rough calculations suggest that the global value in
terms of carbon sequestration alone doubles the value of the logging concessions, so
conservation is on the bargaining frontier.38 In the absence of any offers, in March 2009
the Government made good on its threat and process of determining forest concessions
began. In terms of the bargaining framework, the process appears to be stuck at the
conflict point.
Similar threats were issued by President Rafael Correa of Ecuador in relation to the
Yasuni National Park at a meeting of the United Nations in September of 2007. Again,
the conflict point and the share of the surplus were clearly defined, albeit under different
circumstances to Cameroon. The conflict point was defined as the development of the
oil fields beneath National Park. The share of the cooperative surplus, arising from
leaving oil in the ground, included compensation for lost oil revenues from the
international community, which resembles the incremental cost component, and carbon
credits amounting to the foregone carbon emissions, reflecting a payment for the stock
of carbon39. This contractual solution bears more than a passing resemblence to the
optimal contract under strategic threats. This approach has been more successful than in
the case of Cameroon, and has received numerous pledges of finance. Nevertheless, to
date the threat remains on the table until sufficient finance is attracted.
Both of these examples represent attempts to dislodge the status quo and certainly
represent active use of threats, or at the very least, a laying bare of the structure of the
bargaining game. Threats are not the only responses to the status quo that have been
witnessed in the realm of biodiversity. The formation of the Group of Like Minded
Mega-Diverse Countries (LMMC) represents an alternative means by which to garner
bargaining power, dislodge current solutions and improve benefit sharing. In the context
of the bargaining problem discussed here, this could represent an attempt to develop a
credible threat, or, an attempt to influence the sharing rule, α . In sum, these recent
responses support the main finding here, that current solutions are unlikely to be long
lasting despite ostensibly solving the externality problem for now.

6. Conclusion

37

See "The price of conservation: the unkindest cut", in The Economist print edition, 14 February 2008.
The 830 000 ha of forest in the Ngoyla-Mintom store over 200 million tonnes of carbon dioxide
(assuming a conservative 250 tonnes of carbon dioxide/ha). Assuming conservation reverses the 1% trend
in deforestations, and assuming emissions of 160 tonnes of carbon dioxide/ha from logging, at US$3
/tonne of CO2, payments for carbon through the REDD scheme would generate credits with an NPV of
US$64 million (over 30 years at 5% discount). This exceeds the US$26 million in logging concession
fees (The Economist print edition, 14th February 2008).
39
It is estimated that leaving the ITT oil undeveloped would result in permanently sequestering nearly 436
million tons of carbon dioxide in the ground.
38
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We have several conclusions to report from this discursion on the problem of and
policies for regulating global biodiversity.
First, it is important to recognise that the problem of global biodiversity regulation is
distinct from many of the smaller externality-driven policies regarding land use
management and conservation. These are local, regional and national biodiversity
policies addressed to the internalisation of the broader values of unconverted lands.
There is a function to be served by reason of sharing information widely on costeffective local policies, but this has nothing to do with global biodiversity regulation – a
different problem.
Second, the problem of global biodiversity regulation has foundered over the past
twenty years. There have been a few attempts at creating policies for conservation
under the broad rubric of the CBD: principally incremental cost contracts and benefit
sharing regimes. We have argued here that the former represents an attempt to place the
providers on their participation constraint, while the former has accomplished nothing
to date at all.
Third, the most promising regime for land conversion at the global level exists at
present under the climate change regime. REDD+ provides a basic mechanism for
making transfers to developing countries in exchange for carbon credits, and it has been
ushered in rapidly to great fanfare. The problem with using a carbon sequestration
mechanism for regulating land conversion is that these are two distinct problems. At a
minimum there is the argument that two policy objectives warrant two distinct
instruments. At worst, there is the possibility that the biodiversity problem is being
subsumed into the climate change problem, i.e. it is assumed that it is solved when the
climate change land use problem is addressed. Nevertheless, these are theoretical issues
at present, and it is interesting to note the recent developments under the UNFCCC
regarding deforestation issues, and to ponder why the major efforts at global land use
regulation have occurred in the context of a climate regime (rather than the biodiversity
one).
Fourth, we have described in passing the manner in which a global land use policy
mechanism should operate. A transfer mechanism needs to be put into place that
enables payments to those countries in correspondence with and for each year in which
they do not convert areas of existing natural habitats. This implies a long time horizon
of ongoing payments for unconverted lands, but this is precisely the sort of mechanism
which the biodiversity bargaining problem describes as its solution. There needs to be
some means of sharing the benefits of land-based development between those states that
have converted with those which have not.
It is important to begin thinking more generally about the great environment and
development conventions as questions of cooperation over the production of joint
surplus from such industries. The climate change regime should probably be thought
of as a problem of deciding how to distribute the gains from fossil-fuel based
development between those who have had it, and those who never will. Similarly, the
global problem of biodiversity regulation has little to do with internalising local or
regional externalities (such as watersheds) or with conserving amenities (such as
elephants). The international policy problem of regulating global biodiversity concerns
the determination of the total converted land area that will provide the optimal ratio of

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 682 [2012]

inputs to and outputs from biological industries. Again the fundamental problem at its
heart concerns determining the distribution of gains between those states that have
previously developed their lands, and those who agree to never do so. The realisation of
real policies on global biodiversity regulation awaits the recognition of these
fundamental bargains that must be made. Until then, our analysis (and the current
record) demonstrates that we can expect to see continuing conversion and deforestation
in those countries that are going uncompensated – according to their perceptions of
fairness.
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Fig. 1. Global Regulation of Biodiversity – Optimal Land Use Conversion
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of the biotech industry
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Figure 3. Conflict Points and Bargaining Frontiers
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Figure X.4. The bargaining problem with strategic threats
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